Corruption and Cooperation
A report on "Corruption and Cooperation in hierarchical organizations: an experimental study on the Department of the Interior" by professor of the International Institute of Economics and Finance, Guest of the MSSE A. Belyanin.
 A. Belyanin |
A report on "Corruption and Cooperation in hierarchical organizations: an experimental study on the Department of the Interior" by professor of the International Institute of Economics and Finance, Guest of the Center A. Belyanin.
In recent years the problem of corruption has attracted great interest of academic economists who study it from different points of view. In particular, a significant role in determining its extent and scope of play features of the institutional environment, folding social norms, as well as a reaction to the incentives of agents to corruption and measures to combat it. In this paper, a set of these problems is investigated experimentally by the example of two audiences - students from different the Department of the Interior. The experimental results show that the second audience, unlike the first, is less prone to purely equilibrium behavior, a higher level of cooperativity in protection from anti-corruption audits (including the willingness to "pay" for the safety of other members of the group to the detriment of their personal interests), and relatively more high willingness to abandon corruption, when the benefits of honest work is increasing substantially.