Center Referative Seminar: report of V. Ivanova, Ph. Ushchev, D. Pokrovsky, S. Kichko
On May 10-11, 2012 Center Referative Seminar on S. Anderson, N. Erkal and D. Piccinin "Aggregative Games with Entry". Presentations were made by: guest of MSSE Vera Ivanova, Senior Research Fellow Philip Ushchev, Research Fellows Dmitry Pokrovsky and Sergey Kichko.
On May 10-11, 2012 Center Referative Seminar on S. Anderson, N. Erkal and D. Piccinin "Aggregative Games with Entry". Presentations were made by: guest of MSSE Vera Ivanova, Senior Research Fellow Philip Ushchev, Research Fellows Dmitry Pokrovsky and Sergey Kichko.
Aggregative games are used to model strategic interaction in many fields of economics, including industrial organization, political economy, international trade, and public finance. In such games, each player’s payoff depends on his/her own actions and an aggregate of all player’s actions. Examples in industrial organization are the Cournot oligopoly model, logit and CES differentiated products Bertrand models (and linear demand models in the short run), and R&D games. We suppose a change affects some of the players, such as cost shocks (subsidies, tariffs), privatization, and a merger or RJV. In a unifying framework, we determine the impact of the change on the aggregate variable, producer surplus and consumer surplus under free entry. We also show that the IIA property of demands implies that consumer surplus depends on the aggregate alone, and the corresponding Bertrand pricing game is aggregative.
Download 1st presentation of the report
Download 2nd presentation of the report
Photo report about the seminar: