

# New Trade Theory without the Agricultural Sector

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- Zeng, D.-Z. and Uchikawa, T. (2012): The Home Market Effect in a Multicountry Space.  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2056129>.
- Tan, L. and Zeng, D.-Z. (2012): Developing and Developed Economies: a Synthesis of First and Second Natures. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2056181>
- Zhou, Y. and Zeng, D.-Z. (2012): Offshoring, Globalization and Welfare.  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2056214>

# New trade theory (NTT)

- **First nature** Ricardian and H-O comparative advantage  
⇒ inter-industry trade
- Leontief paradox, Intraindustry trade
- **Second nature** The role of IRS
- The Home Market Effect (HME)
  - A country with a relatively larger local demand attracts a more-than-proportionate share of manufacturing firms
  - The wage is higher in a larger country
  - The large country is a net exporter of manufactured goods
- Under CRS, no HME

# The agricultural good

- Two basic assumptions
  - two countries/regions
  - the existence of an agricultural good: homogeneous and freely traded
- Agricultural good: equalizing labor wages
  - simplifies model very much
  - an outside good
  - wages are not equalized across countries in the real world
- This presentation: NTT without the agricultural good
  - the HME in a multicountry space
  - endogenous offshoring
  - wage inequalities among developing and developed countries

# The HME in a multicountry space

- There are some papers on the core-periphery model in a multiregion space
- Behrens, Lamorgese, Ottaviano, and Tabuchi (2009): the HME in a multicountry world with the freely traded agricultural good
  - prove the existence of HME in terms of firm share when there are no geographical advantage and technical advantage among countries
  - no information about wage

# The model

- $n$  countries are different only in population size
  - total population  $L$ , total capital  $K$
  - Each worker owns 1 labor +  $K/L$  capital
  - Population shares:  $\theta_1 \geq \theta_2 \geq \dots \geq \theta_n$
- Only one sector: manufacturing goods


- Utility function  $U_i = \left[ \int_0^N d_i(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$

- Behrens and Murata (2007): multiplicatively quasi-separable function

- **Fixed**: 1 capital, **Marginal**:  $(\sigma - 1)/\sigma$  labor

- Trade cost  $\tau_{ij} = \begin{cases} \tau & \text{if } i \neq j \\ 1 & \text{if } i = j \end{cases}$ ,  $\phi_{ij} = \tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma}$

- Exclude first-nature features




# Equilibrium

- Numéraire: labor in country 1. Wages:  $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n$
- Firm shares  $k_i = \frac{w_i \theta_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n \theta_j w_j}$
- $w_i$  are determined by ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ )

$$1 - w_i^{1-\sigma} \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} w_j + \frac{1}{\sigma} \sum_{k=1}^n \theta_k w_k}{(1-\phi) w_j^{2-\sigma} + \phi \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{\theta_k}{\theta_j} w_k^{2-\sigma}} \phi_{ij} = 0 \quad (1)$$

- We cannot obtain an analytical solution for  $w_i$

# A simulation result





# Equilibrium: some findings

- The equivalence of two HME definitions

- $\frac{k_1}{\theta_1} \geq \frac{k_2}{\theta_2} \geq \dots \geq \frac{k_n}{\theta_n}$
- $w_1 \geq w_2 \geq \dots \geq w_n$

- The existence of the HME

- to show that (1) has a solution in  $[\phi^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, \mathbf{1}]^n$ 
  - Fixed point theorem
  - How to find the mapping? My student gave up.
  - to show that  $\mathbf{1} \geq w_2 \geq \dots \geq w_n$

- U-shape of wages

# Mapping

- Rewrite (1) as  $\mathbf{1} - w_i^{1-\sigma} \sum_{j=1}^n H_j(w, \phi) \phi_{ij} = \mathbf{0}$  where

$$H_j(w, \phi) \equiv \frac{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} w_j + \frac{1}{\sigma} \sum_{k=1}^n \theta_k w_k}{(1 - \phi) w_j^{2-\sigma} + \phi \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{\theta_k}{\theta_j} w_k^{2-\sigma}}, \text{ for } w \in (0, \infty)^n$$

- Fixed point of mapping  $\mathcal{M}(w, \phi) = w$ , where

$$\mathcal{M}_i(w, \phi) = \begin{cases} \{(1 - \phi)[H_i(w, \phi) - H_1(w, \phi)] + 1\}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, & \text{if } \sigma \geq 2 \\ w_i^{2-\sigma} \{(1 - \phi)[H_i(w, \phi) - H_1(w, \phi)] + 1\}, & \text{if } \sigma \in (1, 2) \end{cases}$$

## Mapping (cont.)

- $w_{-1} = (w_2, \dots, w_n) \in (0, \infty)^{n-1}$ ,  $w = (1, w_{-1})$
- $\mathcal{M}_1(w, \phi) = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{M}_{-1}(w, \phi) = (\mathcal{M}_2, \dots, \mathcal{M}_n)$  maps  $(0, \infty)^{n-1}$  to  $(0, \infty)^{n-1}$
- $\mathcal{M}_{-1}(w, \phi)$  maps  $[\phi^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, 1]^{n-1}$  to  $[\phi^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, 1]^{n-1}$ 
  - $H_1(w) \leq 1$  for  $w_{-1} \in [\phi^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, 1]^{n-1}$
  - $H_i(w, \phi) \leq H_1(w, \phi)$  when  $\sigma \geq 2$  and  $(1 - \phi)[H_i(w, \phi) - H_1(w, \phi)] + 1 \leq w_i^{\sigma-1}$  when  $\sigma \in (1, 2)$
- **Theorem 1** For any  $\sigma \in (1, \infty)$ , there exist equilibrium wage rates  $w(\phi)$  with  $w_j(\phi) \in [\phi^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, 1]$ .
- **Theorem 3**  $1 = w_1 > w_2 > \dots > w_n$  if  $\theta_1 > \theta_2 > \dots > \theta_n$ 
  - Curves  $w_i(\phi)$  cross at  $(0, 1)$  and  $(1, 1)$  for  $\phi \in [0, 1]$
  - By implicit function theorem,  $w'_j(0) = \sigma \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_j} \right)$  so  $w'_1(0) > w'_2(0) > \dots > w'_n(0)$

# U-shaped wage curves

- **Theorem 4** If  $\theta_1 > \theta_2 > \dots > \theta_n$ , the relative wage  $w_i/w_j$  for any two countries  $i > j$  evolves as a U-shaped curve with respect to  $\phi$ .
  - equation  $\mathcal{M}_i(w, \phi) = w_i$  can be rewritten as a quadratic function of  $\phi$
  - Only possible forms of  $w_i(\phi)$  are: (i) increasing for all  $\phi \in (0, 1)$ ; (ii) decreasing for all  $\phi \in (0, 1)$ ; (iii) an inverted-U-shaped curve; (iv) a U-shaped curve.
  - Only (iv) is possible because

$$w'_i(1) = \frac{\theta_1 - \theta_i}{\sigma - 1} > 0, \quad w'_i(0) = \sigma \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_j} \right) < 0.$$

# U-shaped wage curves (cont.)

- Economics inside
  - A higher concentration of firms within a country increases wages there, giving two opposite forces.
    - final demand increases because of consumers' higher incomes, which encourages more agglomeration of firms;
    - the higher wage rate increases the labor costs of firms there, which is a dispersion force discouraging agglomeration
  - The dispersion force is large when  $\phi$  is large and the agglomeration force is small when  $\phi$  is small, resulting the U shape of wage rates.


# HME in terms of trade pattern

- Trade balance: trade surplus of manufactured goods in each country is equal to the net flow of capital rent
- A larger country exports  $M$  more than a smaller country iff

$$k_i - \theta_i \geq k_{i+1} - \theta_{i+1}, \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n - 1.$$

- Not always true: a simulation example
- Among 3 definitions, wage order seems to be empirical appeal. Simplest to be tested.

# HME in terms of trade pattern (cont.)



# Wage inequalities

- Williamson (1965): U-shaped patterns of wages
- Explore the wage inequality between developing and developed countries
  - two-country model
  - two kinds of first natures, Ricardo+ H-O
  - second nature: IRS

$$\pi_n = p_{nn}d_{nn} + p_{ns}d_{ns} - \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\eta w(d_{nn} + \tau d_{ns}) - r_n$$

$\theta L$	$\gamma K$	$w$	$kK$	Country N (Developed)
$\phi = \tau^{1-\sigma}$				mobile capital
$(1 - \theta)L$	$(1 - \gamma)L$	$1$	$(1 - k)K$	Country S (Developing)

$$\pi_s = p_{ss}d_{ss} + p_{sn}d_{sn} - \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}(d_{ss} + \tau d_{sn}) - \kappa r_s.$$



# Key Parameters $\eta$ , $\kappa$ and $\gamma$

## ■ Ricardian Comparative Advantage (technology)

- $\pi_n = p_{nn}d_{nn} + p_{ns}d_{ns} - \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\eta w(d_{nn} + \tau d_{ns}) - r_n$
- $\pi_s = p_{ss}d_{ss} + p_{sn}d_{sn} - \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}(d_{ss} + \tau d_{sn}) - \kappa r_s$
- $\alpha = \eta^{1-\sigma}\kappa \in (0, +\infty)$

## ■ Heckscher-Ohlin Comparative Advantage (resource)


- Large  $\gamma \Rightarrow$  High per capita stock in developed country
- $\gamma > \theta > 1/2 \Rightarrow$  Developed country is larger (America–Mexico)
- $\theta < \gamma < 1/2 \Rightarrow$  Developed country is smaller (Japan–China)

# Wage equation

- Firm share  $k = \frac{\theta w}{\theta w + 1 - \theta}$
- $\mathcal{F}(w) \equiv \Psi_0(w) + \Psi_1(w)\phi + \Psi_2(w)\phi^2 = 0$ 
  - $\Psi_0(w) \equiv \alpha[w\theta(1 - \gamma) - \gamma(1 - \theta)]w^{1-\sigma}$
  - $\Psi_1(w) \equiv \sigma(1 - \theta - \alpha^2 w^{3-2\sigma}\theta)$
  - $\Psi_2(w) \equiv \alpha w^{1-\sigma}[(1 - \theta)(\gamma - \sigma) + w\theta(\sigma + \gamma - 1)]$
- **Proposition 1** Wage  $w$  increases in  $\alpha$  and  $\gamma$
- Economics inside
  - Industry agglomerates according to the first nature.
  - The stronger the advantage is, the more the industry agglomerates.
  - Consistent with traditional theory.

# On the first natures

- **Proposition 2** When  $\phi$  is small,  $\frac{\partial w}{\partial \gamma}(\phi) > \frac{\partial w}{\partial \alpha}(\phi)$ . When  $\phi$  is large,  $\frac{\partial w}{\partial \alpha}(\phi) > \frac{\partial w}{\partial \gamma}(\phi)$ .



- Economics inside


## On the first natures (cont.)

- High trade costs ( $\phi$  is small):  
The H-O advantage > The Ricardian advantage.
  - **Hard** to serve the foreign market  $\Rightarrow$  Higher efficiency in North **does not** rise capital return  $\Rightarrow$  Ricardian advantage is **weak**.
  - Since **market access** is important  $\Rightarrow$  Income Distribution is important  $\Rightarrow$  the H-O advantage is **strong**.
- Low trade costs ( $\phi$  is large):  
The Ricardian advantage > The H-O advantage.
  - **Easy** to serve the foreign market  $\Rightarrow$  Higher efficiency in North **does** rise capital return  $\Rightarrow$  Ricardian advantage is **strong**.
  - Since **labor access** is important  $\Rightarrow$  Endowment of mobile factor is less important  $\Rightarrow$  the H-O advantage is **weak**.


# Wage curve

- **Proposition 3** The possible forms of  $w(\phi)$  are increasing, decreasing,  $U$  shape or inverted- $U$  shape, as shown in the following figures.
- Existing theoretical studies are limited.
  - Simple evolution pattern
    - **Divergence**: Krugman (1991), Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
    - **Inverted U-pattern**: Venables (1996), Puga (1999), Picard and Zeng (2010), Amiti (2005), Epifani (2005) and Tabuchi and Thisse (2002).
  - Most papers refer to regional inequality in terms of **firm share rather than income**


## Wage curve (cont.)




Form I: decreasing



Form II: inverted-U shape



Form III: increasing



Form IV: U shape

# Endogenous offshoring

- Offshoring and onshoring
  - Offshoring: do some tasks abroad
  - Obama (2012, address to Congress): “We have a huge opportunity, at this moment, to bring manufacturing back.”
  - General Electric has decided to move production of a water heater to Louisville of Kentucky, from China
  - NCR, a maker of self-service kiosks and automated teller machines, has shifted jobs to Columbus of Georgia
- IRS needs to be addressed. NEG/NTT models are necessary. But
  - most NEG models have exogenous wages, no onshoring
  - existing NEG/NTT models are limited to corner equilibrium

# Application to offshoring

- Economy space: larger country 1 and smaller country 2
  - Wages:  $w_1 = 1$ ,  $w_2 = w$ . Without offshoring,  $1 \geq w$
  - Offshoring volume: share  $m$  tasks of firms in country 1 offshore to country 2
- **Offshoring cost**  $\xi$ : ICT (information and communication technologies)
  - foreign labor is discounted by  $\xi \geq 1$
  - offshoring freeness  $\mu = \xi^{1-\sigma}$
- profits of firms in country 1


$$\pi_1 = p_{11}d_{11} + p_{12}d_{12} - \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \bar{w}_1 (d_{11} + \tau d_{12}) - r_1$$

$$\bar{w}_1 = (1 - m)w_1 + m\xi w_2$$



# Wage curve

- Whenever offshoring happens,  $w = 1/\xi$
- no offshoring if  $w$  is high enough



## Wage curve (cont.)

$$\bar{\phi} = \frac{\sigma[\theta\mu^2 - (1 - \theta)\mu^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}] - \sqrt{\Delta_2}}{2\mu\mathcal{A}_0},$$
$$\underline{\phi} = \frac{\sigma[\theta\mu^2 - (1 - \theta)\mu^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}] + \sqrt{\Delta_2}}{2\mu\mathcal{A}_0},$$

where


$$\Delta_2 = \sigma^2[\theta\mu^2 - (1 - \theta)\mu^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}]^2 - 4\theta\mu^2(1 - \theta)(1 - \mu^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}})\mathcal{A}_0,$$

$$\mathcal{A}_0 = (2\theta - 1)\sigma + (1 - \mu^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}})(1 - \theta)(\sigma - \theta) > 0.$$

$$\mu_{\min} \implies \Delta_2 = 0, \quad \bar{\phi} = \underline{\phi}$$

# Offshoring volume

- **Proposition 1** For  $\phi \in [\underline{\phi}, \bar{\phi}]$ , offshoring volume evolves in an inverted-U pattern when transport costs decline.



## Offshoring volume (cont.)

- Empirical support
- Figure 3
  - Offshoring keeps increasing for all nine industries until 2007.
  - From 2007, the fragmentation intensity in industries like furniture and fixtures, electrical equipment shows a tendency to slow down.
  - The offshoring volume even descends to form an inverted-U pattern in industries like primary metal manufacturing, miscellaneous manufactured commodities, plastics and rubber products.

# Welfare of offshoring

$$\omega_1 = \frac{[1 - \theta + (\sigma + \theta - 1)\mu^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}}{\sigma - 1} \left[ \frac{K\theta(1 - \phi^2)\mu}{\sigma(1 - \phi\mu)(1 - \theta + \theta\mu^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}})} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}},$$
$$\omega_2 = \frac{(\sigma - \theta + \theta\mu^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}})^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}}{\sigma - 1} \left[ \frac{K(1 - \theta)(1 - \phi^2)\mu}{\sigma(\mu - \phi)(1 - \theta + \theta\mu^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}})} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

- Japan is worrying about the hollowing out of industry
- Two kinds of globalization
  - $\phi \uparrow$
  - $\mu \uparrow$

# Welfare of offshoring (cont.)

Let


$$\phi^{\#} = \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - \mu^2}}{\mu}$$

## ■ Proposition 2

- In area I,  $\omega_1$  decreases in  $\phi$ .
- In II & III,  $\omega_1$  increases in  $\phi$ ;
- $\omega_2$  always increases in  $\phi$ .

## ■ Economics inside

- When  $\phi \uparrow$ , firms  $\rightarrow$  country 2
  - Price  $\downarrow$ , firm share  $\downarrow$
- When offshoring is easy,  $\omega_1(\phi)$  has an inverted-U shape
- When offshoring is difficult,  $\omega_1(\phi)$  increases



# Welfare of offshoring (cont.)

## ■ Proposition 3

- $\mu \uparrow \Rightarrow \omega_1 \uparrow$

- $\mu \uparrow \Rightarrow \omega_2 \downarrow$

## ■ Contrastive to Fujita and Thisse (2006), Robert-Nicoud (2008)

- They consider corner equilibrium agglomeration in country 1

- No firms move from country 2 to country 1, which is captured here

# Conclusion

- With mobile capital, we do not need  $A$  in NTT
- The HME is a quite general property. Definition by wage is the best
- Without the wage equalization, we can analyze various wage inequalities
- Application to offshoring and others (?)